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2008, we identify whether initial funds and founder-speciﬁc characteris-
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11. Introduction
When founders start businesses, ﬁnancing is essential to the success of the
businesses. At start-up, most, if not all, ﬁrms have access not only to internal
but also to external capital. However, some cannot obtain suﬃcient funds
for investment from external capital markets due to information asymmetries
between founders and providers of external capital. Especially for high-tech
start-ups, ﬁnancing of research and development (R&D) is critical, and ﬁnan-
cial constraints often discourage investment in R&D projects. The lack of
funds for R&D may sometimes threaten the solvency of the ﬁrms.
Whereas physical capital of start-up ﬁrms tends to be scarce, founders’
human capital plays a crucial role as valuable resources of start-up ﬁrms.
Founders’ human capital may have a signiﬁcant impact on R&D ﬁnancing.
Founders with high human capital are expected to succeed in R&D projects,
which would yield large proﬁts. Such ﬁrms may tend to raise more funds for
investment from external capital markets. Even though, in practice, capital
markets are not perfect, founders’ human capital may signal their potential
capabilities to providers of external capital. For these reasons, it is conceivable
that R&D investment decisions depend on the founder’s human capital. Nev-
ertheless, the eﬀects of human capital of founders on R&D investment have
been largely ignored in previous literature. One reason is that there are few
data sources including R&D investment and ﬁnancing of start-up ﬁrms.
This paper explores R&D ﬁnancing of start-up ﬁrms. Using a sample from
an original survey conducted in 2008, we identify whether initial funds and
founder-speciﬁc characteristics relate to R&D investment of start-up ﬁrms in
Japan. It is found that internal ﬁnance is positively associated with R&D in-
vestment. It is also found that founders with higher educational background,
2prior innovation output and academic aﬃliation tend to raise more funds for
R&D. On the other hand, R&D investment may depend heavily on investment
opportunities. Therefore, we estimate the determinants of R&D investment,
taking into account the demand for R&D.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section,
we review related literature. Section 3 discusses the theoretical background
for understanding R&D ﬁnancing of start-up ﬁrms, and shows our analytical
framework. Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis. The estimation
methods and results are presented in Section 5. The ﬁnal section includes
some concluding remarks.
2. Literature review
A large number of studies have argued that ﬁrms face diﬃculties in their ac-
cess to external capital markets (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Ma-
jluf, 1984). Even though a ﬁrm with high growth potential starts a business,
providers of external capital, such as banks and investors, cannot accurately
assess the potentiality. This is due to capital market imperfections stemming
from information asymmetries between ﬁrms and providers of external capi-
tal. It is often argued that the cost of external ﬁnance increases by monitoring
cost and risk premium. Also, as Carpenter and Petersen (2002a) emphasize,
because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, external ﬁnance is
more expensive than internal ﬁnance. More speciﬁcally, information asymme-
tries are relatively large at start-up, since start-up ﬁrms lack track records.
These ﬁrms are likely to face diﬃculties in ﬁnancing, and funding gaps would
arise from imperfections in capital markets.1
1For an overview of entrepreneurial ﬁnance, see, for example, Denis (2004).
3For start-up ﬁrms, it may be more diﬃcult to ﬁnance R&D from external
capital markets. This is probably due to the features of R&D. Kamien and
Schwartz (1978), for example, discuss two reasons. First, external ﬁnancing is
diﬃcult to obtain without substantial related tangible collateral to be claimed
by the lender if the project fails, and an R&D project that fails generally
leaves behind few tangible assets of value.2 Carpenter and Petersen (2002a)
also pointed out that physical investments designed to embody R&D results
are likely to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc and, therefore, have little collateral value. Sec-
ond, the ﬁrm is reluctant to reveal detailed information about the project
that would make it attractive to outsider lenders, fearing its disclosure to po-
tential rivals. As Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) argued, adverse selection
problems may be pronounced in high-tech industries because ﬁrms have to
maintain information asymmetries actively to appropriate returns on innova-
tion. In addition to these reasons, Carpenter and Petersen (2002a) argued that
the returns to high-tech investment are skewed and highly uncertain, in part
because R&D projects have low probability of ﬁnancial success. As Colombo
and Grilli (2007) emphasize, greater uncertainty deters investments, as there
is greater risk of incurring sunk costs. Despite the high risk of R&D projects,
most part of the investment is used to produce ﬁrm-speciﬁc equipment, which
is less desirable as collateral. Consequently, the features of R&D would pre-
vent start-up ﬁrms from accessing to external capital markets.
On the other hand, as Aghion et al. (2004) pointed out, more innovative
ﬁrms are likely to generate more attractive investment opportunities than less
innovative ﬁrms. If so, they are likely to be more reliant on external ﬁnance
than less innovative ﬁrms. Although the demand for R&D investment appears
2Hall (2002) pointed out that 50% or more of R&D spending is the wages and salaries of
highly educated scientists and engineers.
4high for start-up ﬁrms pursuing innovation, it is not easy to raise funds for
R&D from providers of external capital. In fact, Himmelberg and Petersen
(1994) found a large, positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
R&D investment and internal ﬁnance. They argued that the ﬂow of internal
ﬁnance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small, high-tech ﬁrms
acquire technology through R&D. More recently, Brown et al. (2009) found the
signiﬁcant eﬀects of cash ﬂow on ﬁnancing of R&D for young, but not mature,
ﬁrms, using dynamic R&D models for high-tech ﬁrms. Given imperfections in
capital markets, R&D investment—especially that of start-up ﬁrms—depends
heavily on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial conditions, including the sources of ﬁnance. The
availability of internal capital, therefore, would aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision on
R&D investment.
As well as internal capital, human capital may have an impact on R&D
ﬁnancing at start-up. As Hall (2002) pointed out, the eﬀorts of educated sci-
entists and engineers create an intangible asset, from which proﬁts in future
years will be generated as the ﬁrm’s knowledge. Also, Cressy (1996) empha-
sizes that human capital is the ‘true’ determinant of ﬁrm survival and that
the correlation between ﬁnancial capital and survival is spurious. Therefore,
human capital, rather than ﬁnancial capital, may relate to R&D output and
post-entry performance. On the other hand, human capital may also aﬀect
the ﬁnancing of R&D. Under imperfections in capital markets, human capi-
tal acts as a valid signal toward providers of external capital. Especially for
start-up ﬁrms, the human capital of founders appears to play a key role in
R&D ﬁnancing. With respect to start-up ﬁnancing, for example, Bates (1990)
argued that owner educational background is a major determinant of the ﬁ-
nancial capital structure of small business start-ups. ˚ Astebro and Bernhardt
5(2005) also indicated that ﬁrm capital is generally increasing in human capi-
tal.3 These ﬁndings imply that the founder’s human capital exerts a positive
eﬀect on the R&D ﬁnancing of start-up ﬁrms.
While a large number of previous studies have examined the determinant
of R&D investment or start-up ﬁnancing, little attention has been paid in pre-
vious studies to the relationship between R&D and human capital of start-up
ﬁrms. As one of the few exceptions, Colombo and Grilli (2007) shed light on
start-up ﬁnancing of new technology-based ﬁrms, using young and indepen-
dent Italian ﬁrms that operate in high-tech industries, both in manufacturing
and services. They found that the level of ﬁnancial leverage decreases with
variables that are indicative of a greater amount of available personal wealth
to ﬁnance ﬁrms’ start-up. Although they analyzed access to the sources of
start-up ﬁnancing, such as personal capital and bank loans, they did not con-
sider ﬁrms’ investment decisions.4 That is, it is still unclear whether founders’
human capital aﬀects the R&D investment decisions of start-up ﬁrms.
Whereas high-tech start-ups start businesses to drive innovation, the fact
that R&D projects are diﬃcult to ﬁnance is due in part to imperfections in cap-
ital markets. As Hall (2002) argued, this fact would result in under-provision
of R&D investment in the economy. Since innovation driven by start-up ﬁrms
is expected to contribute to future economic growth, further research on start-
up ﬁnancing and R&D investment would be needed to provide information to
improve environment for start-up ﬁrms.
3In addition, Parker and van Praag (2006) and Honjo (2007) indicated that educational
background is associated with lower ﬁnancial constraints. In contrast, Cassar (2004) found
that a major decision maker’s characteristics do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence upon start-up
ﬁnancing.
4Okamuro (2006) examined the eﬀect of educational background on R&D intensity, but
its eﬀect was not signiﬁcant.
63. Analytical framework
The premise of this paper is that imperfections in capital markets create a
wedge between the costs of internal and external ﬁnance. As already argued,
this is due to information asymmetries between founders and external suppliers
of capital. Figure 1 portrays the supply of funds to a start-up ﬁrm and the
demand for R&D investment by the ﬁrm. Following Hall (2002), the horizontal
axis, k, measures R&D investment, while the vertical axis, ρ, measures the
(marginal) cost of funds.5
First, the supply curve, S, is depicted in Figure 1, according to ﬁnancing
hierarchy.6 ρin represents the cost of internal ﬁnance. It is assumed that
the cost of external ﬁnance is higher than that of internal ﬁnance because
of imperfections in capital markets due to information asymmetries between
founders and external suppliers of capital. Also, the cost of external ﬁnance
increases with k, partly because the risk premium increases with it. Therefore,
the ﬁrm uses external ﬁnance after exhausting internal ﬁnance. In other words,
external ﬁnance compensates for insuﬃcient funds resulting from less internal
ﬁnance. As shown in Figure 1, the supply curve is ﬂat as long as the R&D
investment is ﬁnanced only by internal capital, kin, and the curve slopes up
over it.7
Then, the demand curve, D, which indicates the ﬁrm’s marginal product
of R&D investment, is drawn in Figure 1. The demand curve is negatively
slope but highly elastic. One reason is that most start-up ﬁrms have trivial
5See also Hubbard (1998), and Carpenter and Petersen (2002a, b).
6For more discussions on ﬁnancing hierarchy, see, for example, Fazzari et al. (1988) and
Berger and Udell (1998).
7Since we focus only on start-up ﬁnancing, we do not take into account new equity
ﬁnancing. Therefore, we describe the supply curve with constantly increasing slope over the
quantity of internal ﬁnance.
7market shares and they do not have inﬂuence on product price. In addition,
the ﬁrm’s demand for R&D, which relates to the R&D investment decision,
depends on the returns received from the R&D project and the probability
of success of R&D. Even if the marginal return remarkably decreases with
an increase in R&D investment, the marginal probability of the success does
not sharply decrease with it. In Figure 1, without imperfections in external
markets, the cost of funds equals the marginal product of R&D investment at
k∗. However, information asymmetries indeed exist between the founder and
external suppliers of capital. As a result, the ﬁrm invests in R&D at k0.
On the other hand, especially for start-up ﬁrms, founders’ human capital
may play a major role in ﬁnancing from external capital markets. Highly
educated founders may be able to raise funds because they have more valuable
knowledge and network for business. Such founders may also use their abilities
to the application procedure of external ﬁnance. In addition, under imperfect
information in the market, signaling is more likely to aﬀect the cost of funds
at start-up. High human capital may attract potential investors. From the
viewpoint of investors, R&D projects undertaken by founders with high human
capital, such as technologically trained founders, are expected to yield large
returns. In Figure 1, the supply curve, S′, applies to the founder who has high
human capital. In this case, the founder with high human capital can raise
funds at k1.
Given the ﬁrm’s demand for R&D, we consider that R&D investment is
determined not only by the ﬁrm’s internal ﬁnance but also by the founder’s
human capital. Let R denote R&D investment of a start-up ﬁrm, and K0
and X represent the ﬁrm’s internal ﬁnance for R&D and the founder’s human
capital, respectively. Using a function form, f(), we obtain the following
8relationships:
R = f(K0,X) + u (1)
where u is an error term.
In Equation (1), we show our model to examine the eﬀects of internal
ﬁnance and human capital on R&D ﬁnancing of start-up ﬁrms. However, the
ﬁnancing may depend heavily on investment opportunities for R&D. While
some ﬁrms demand a small amount of investment, other ﬁrms require more
funds for large R&D projects. Although the demand curve of R&D investment
is described as ﬁxed in Figure 1, the demand for R&D varies according to the
ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. In Figure 1, a ﬁrm has D as the demand
curve, while another ﬁrm has D′. Thus, we take into account the diﬀerence
not only of the supply curve but also of the demand curve between start-up
ﬁrms. Given the demand for R&D, Q, we rewrite Equation (1) as follows:
R = g(K0,X,Q) + v (2)
where v is an error term.
With respect to the eﬀects of internal ﬁnance and human capital, if internal
ﬁnance forms a large part of ﬁnancial resources for R&D, then R&D investment
may increase with internal ﬁnance. Also, several previous studies have argued
that founders are aware of the likelihood of their ﬁrms’ success while potential
investors are not (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977).8 According to this argument,
whereby the greater the initial funds provided by the founder, the greater
the founder’s perception of the likelihood of success. If so, internal ﬁnance
induces external ﬁnance, and internal ﬁnance has a positive eﬀect on R&D
investment. On the other hand, as Cressy (1996) indicated, human capital
8Avery et al. (1998) pointed out that personal commitments may be important for ﬁrms
seeking certain types of loans as they serve as a signal of the quality of ﬁrms.
9may be the true factor aﬀecting the success of R&D, and human capital,
rather than ﬁnancial capital, relates to R&D output. Based on this view,
the founder’s human capital has more impact on R&D investment. We thus
hypothesize that founders with high human capital, other things being equal,
tend to raise more funds for R&D.
On the other hand, founders’ human capital may aﬀect the demand for
R&D, in addition to R&D investment. Founders with high human capital
may tend to pursue large scale R&D projects, since they have abilities to
conduct such projects. In this respect, there remains the possibility that the
demand for R&D is endogenously determined by founders’ human capital.
When estimating the determinants of R&D investment, therefore, we take
into account the endogeneity of the demand for R&D.9
In the following sections, using data on start-up ﬁrms in Japan, we attempt




The sample used in this analysis comes from an original survey conducted in
2008.10 By sending questionnaires to 13,582 ﬁrms in the Japanese manufactur-
ing and software industries, which were incorporated between January 2007
and August 2008, we constructed the sample of start-up ﬁrms that pursue
9Similarly, we might be able to regard internal ﬁnance as endogenous. As discussed
later, however, the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables for internal ﬁnance and
founder-speciﬁc characteristics are found to be low. In order to avoid the complexity of the
estimation, therefore, we do not use a endogenous model for internal ﬁnance. In this regard,
further investigation into how founders’ human capital aﬀects start-up ﬁnancing may be
warranted.
10For more details on this survey, see Okamuro et al. (2009).
10R&D. The list of ﬁrms for the survey was obtained from a database complied
by Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR) that is a major credit investigation company
in Japan.
The number of eﬀective responses was 1,516 (approximately 11% of the
target). From among the responses, we identiﬁed 1,060 ﬁrms that had started
their businesses during 2007 and 2008.11 Also, 487 ﬁrms indeed required R&D
investment, and these ﬁrms were selected as the sample for this analysis. As
a result, we obtained 363 ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample because of missing values
for some variables.12
We also used another data source to collect data on industry-speciﬁc char-
acteristics. Data on the appropriability of innovation output and technologi-
cal opportunities were taken and calculated from the Report on the Japanese
National Innovation Survey 2003, compiled by the National Institute of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy (NISTEP) of the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).
4.2. R&D investment
In the questionnaire, we asked how much ﬁrms spend on R&D for one year.
Here, R&D expenditures mean equipment and materials for R&D including
outsourcing cost and labor cost. We deﬁne these expenditures as R&D invest-
ment.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of R&D investment in the sample.
While the average of R&D investment is about 6.8 million yen, the standard
deviation appears very high. Among the 363 ﬁrms, 143 ﬁrms (39.4%) did
11We excluded ﬁrms that were established before December 2006 as sole proprietors and
incorporated after January 2007.
12Among the ﬁrms, one ﬁrm that had no initial funds was excluded from the sample.
11not actually spend on R&D, even though they required R&D investment. On
the other hand, the sample includes not only independent ﬁrms but also sub-
sidiaries and aﬃliated ﬁrms, which perhaps are ﬁnancially supported by their
parent ﬁrms. Therefore, Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of R&D invest-
ment separately for independent ﬁrms, and subsidiaries and aﬃliated ﬁrms.
Table 1 indicates that the R&D investment of subsidiaries and aﬃliated ﬁrms
is distinctly larger than that of independent ﬁrms.
4.3. Internal ﬁnance: initial funds
In the traditional investment model, cash-ﬂow has often been used to cap-
ture the access to internal ﬁnance that hypothetically mitigates ﬁnancial con-
straints.13 However, cash-ﬂow is not appropriate as a proxy for the access to
internal ﬁnance at start-up, since most start-up ﬁrms have not yet established
cash-ﬂow. In the questionnaire, we asked the amount of initial funds from
each type of funding sources, such as founders, and family and friends, at
start-up.14 Instead of cash-ﬂow, using the initial funds provided by founders,
we measure the availability of internal ﬁnance at start-up. As well as the ini-
tial funds provided by the founders themselves, those provided by their family
and friends may be essentially treated as internal ﬁnance. In this paper, there-
fore, the sum of the founder’s own funds and their family’s and friends’ funds
is deﬁned as the variable for internal ﬁnance. For subsidiaries and aﬃliated
ﬁrms, on the other hand, initial funds provided by their parent ﬁrms are also
13For the investment model, see, for example, Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hoshi et al. (1991).
14Several studies have focused on equity ﬁnancing of R&D, and the cost of equity ﬁnance
may diﬀer from that of debt ﬁnance for start-up ﬁrms. For instance, Carpenter and Petersen
(2002a) argued that new equity has many advantages over debt for ﬁnancing high-tech
investment. More recently, M¨ uller and Zimmermann (2009) examined the importance of
equity ﬁnance for the R&D activity of small- and medium-sized enterprises. However, we
do not distinguish equity ﬁnance from debt ﬁnance because we did not ask equity and debt
ﬁnance, separately, in order to reduce respondent burden in answering the questionnaire.
12regarded as internal ﬁnance.
In Table 2, we show the ratio of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by each type of funding
sources at start-up. Table 2 also presents the descriptive statistics of the
funding sources. In addition, Table 2 shows those of internal ﬁnance; that is,
(1) + (2) and (1) + (2) + (6). As shown in Table 2, over 90% of the ﬁrms use
founders’ own funds at start-up, and most of them resort to internal capital.
On the other hand, the average amount of initial funds from parent ﬁrms and
private ﬁnancial institutes (i.e., banks) is remarkably higher.
4.4. Human capital: founder-speciﬁc characteristics
Previous studies have attempted to capture the eﬀects of founders’ or en-
trepreneurs’ human capital on the ﬁrm’s behavior and post-entry performance
(e.g., ˚ Astebro and Bernhardt, 2003; Colombo and Grilli, 2007). In general, hu-
man capital has been measured by founders’ personal attributes, which can be
retrieved from the data source. Colombo and Grilli (2004), for example, argued
that generic human capital is related to the general knowledge acquired by
entrepreneurs both through formal education and professional experience. In
fact, most studies have used educational background as a measure of founders’
human capital (e.g., Bates, 1990; ˚ Astebro and Bernhardt, 2005). Following
these studies, we capture educational background of founders. The dummy
variables, EDU U and EDU G, are used to examine the eﬀects of educational
level—undergraduate university education and graduate school education. As
well as educational background, the dummy variables, EXP W and EXP M,
are used to identify the eﬀects of prior work experience in the related ﬁeld and
prior managerial experience, respectively.
In addition to educational background and work experience, founders’
13prior research activities may relate to R&D investment. The dummy vari-
able, INNOV , is used to measure product/process innovation experience.
This variable indicates the degree of founders’ technological capability. Also,
the dummy variable, ACAD, is used to measure the aﬃliation to academic
associations in the natural sciences. This variable may indicate the extent of
founder’s human network as well as technological capability.
Furthermore, we control the diﬀerence of age and generation between
founders, by using the variable for founders’ age, AGE.
4.5. Demand for R&D
In the traditional investment model, Tobin’s q, which is often measured by the
market value of equity plus the book value of debt, divided by the book value
of total assets, is used as a proxy for investment opportunities (e.g., Fazzari
et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991). Needless to say, however, ﬁrms cannot go
public immediately after starting their businesses, and hence it is diﬃcult to
measure their market values.
In the questionnaire, on the other hand, we asked how much ﬁrms require
R&D investment for one year, in order to obtain suﬃcient R&D output. Using
this value, we capture investment opportunities for R&D, and measure the
demand for R&D investment, Q. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics
of the demand for R&D investment. According to Table 3, on average, the
demand for R&D investment is larger than the actual R&D investment.
4.6. Others
In addition to the above variables, some variables are included in the model.
First, since some start-up ﬁrms were established by multiple founders, the
14dummy variable for multiple founders, MFOUND, is included as a control
variable. Also, as shown in Tables 1 and 3, some start-up ﬁrms in the sample
are founded by their parent ﬁrms, and the ﬁnancial structure may be diﬀerent
from that of independent ﬁrms. Therefore, we use the dummy variable, SUB,
to control the diﬀerence of the ﬁnancial structure of subsidiaries and aﬃliated
ﬁrms. Additionally, the subsample containing only independent ﬁrms will be,
in part, used in the estimation model.
Then, as discussed later, there remains the probability that the demand
for R&D investment depends on founders’ human capital. For this reason, we
attempt to use an endogenous model to estimate the parameters. As instru-
ments, we measure the intention of an initial public oﬀering (IPO), IPO, in
order to capture founders’ motivations for the access to external ﬁnance. Fur-
thermore, the demand for R&D may diﬀer between ﬁrms, according to the in-
dustry’s characteristics. We thus include industry-speciﬁc variables that repre-
sent appropriability and technological opportunities, APPRO and TECOPP,
in the model.
5. Estimation methods and results
5.1. Methods
Based on Equations (1) and (2), we estimate the determinants of R&D invest-
ment, using data on start-up ﬁrms in Japan. Table 4 shows the deﬁnitions of
variables, including instrumentals. As shown in Tables 1 and 3, R&D invest-
ment diﬀers between independent ﬁrms and subsidiaries or aﬃliated ﬁrms.
Not surprisingly, (parent) ﬁrms generally provide initial funds to their sub-
sidiaries when founding new subsidiaries. Therefore, the ﬁnancial structure of
subsidiaries and aﬃliated ﬁrms seems to be considerably diﬀerent from that of
15independent ﬁrms. For this reason, the subsample consisting of independent
ﬁrms is used for our estimation. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of
the independent variables separately for all ﬁrms and independent ﬁrms. The
correlation matrix for independent ﬁrms is shown in Table 6. As shown in
Table 6, the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables for internal ﬁnance
and founder-speciﬁc characteristics are found to be low, which indicate that
founders’ human capital has less inﬂuence on internal capital.
In addition, as already mentioned, some start-up ﬁrms did not actually
invest in R&D; that is, some observations take the value zero. Taking into
account the truncated observations, therefore, we apply a type-I Tobit model
to the estimation.
On the other hand, the demand for R&D is considered to be endogenously
determined, and it may depend in part on founders’ human capital. In order to
take into account the endogeneity of Q, therefore, we also estimate Equation
(2) as a type-I Tobit model with an endogenous regressor. As instruments, we
additionally use IPO, APPROP and TECHOPP.
5.2. Results
We show the estimation results for the determinants of R&D investment in
Table 7. Table 7 shows the results when all the independent variables are
exogenous. While Columns (i), (ii) and (iii) show the results for all ﬁrms,
Columns (iv), (v) and (vi) show those only for independent ﬁrms. Columns
(i) and (iv) show the results only with founder-speciﬁc characteristics and
control variables. Also, Columns (ii) and (v) show the results including the
variable for internal ﬁnance, and Columns (iii) and (vi) show those including
the variables for internal ﬁnance and the demand for R&D investment.
16Table 8 shows the estimation results when the demand for R&D is regarded
as endogenous. In Table 8, we employ the maximum likelihood estimator.
While Columns (i) and (ii) show the estimation results for all ﬁrms, Columns
(iii) and (iv) show those only for independent ﬁrms. Columns (ii) and (iv)
show the estimation results when the variable for internal ﬁnance is included
in the model. While a Wald test of the exogeneity of the instruments was
rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level for independent ﬁrms, it was not rejected
at the 5% signiﬁcance level for all ﬁrms in Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 8.15
Therefore, we will discuss the determinants of R&D investment, including the
results of Table 7. The determinants of the demand for R&D will be discussed
in Appendix.
First, with respect to the eﬀects of human capital, the coeﬃcients of
EDU U and EDU G are positive in Table 7.16 In particular, EDU G has
a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on R&D investment. The results indicate that
founders with higher educational background tend to raise more funds for
R&D. On the other hand, the coeﬃcients of EXP W and EXP M have a
negative sign, but EXP M does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on R&D invest-
ment. Regarding innovation experience, the coeﬃcients of INNOV are overall
positive, indicating that founders with prior innovation experience are more
likely to invest in R&D. In addition, ACAD has a positive eﬀect on R&D in-
vestment, indicating that founders who are members of academic associations
are more likely to invest in R&D, although their eﬀects are insigniﬁcant for
independent ﬁrms. These results suggest that founders who have innovative or
academic activities have an impact on R&D investment. The ﬁndings of this
15For independent ﬁrms, the Wald test was not rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
16By deﬁning the ratio of R&D investment to total initial funds as the dependent variable,
we indeed estimated the determinants of R&D investment as well. However, we did not
obtain more signiﬁcant results regarding the eﬀects of human capital on R&D investment.
17paper imply that founders’ backgrounds, such as graduate school education,
prior innovation experience and academic aﬃliation enable start-up ﬁrms to
raise more funds for R&D. However, the eﬀects of human capital become less
signiﬁcant in Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 7 and all Columns of Table 8
when Q is included, and especially they tend to be signiﬁcant for independent
ﬁrms.
Then, with respect to the eﬀects of internal ﬁnance, the coeﬃcients of
IF FP and IF F are positive and signiﬁcant in Columns (ii) and (v) of Ta-
ble 7. However, their eﬀects do not consistently appear in Columns (iii) and
(vi) of Table 7 when Q is included. This suggests that R&D investment de-
pends more heavily on investment opportunities, rather than internal ﬁnance.
From this ﬁnding, we may say that the availability of internal ﬁnance has no
impact on R&D investment, and, hence, we cannot conclude severe ﬁnancial
constraints for R&D investment of start-up ﬁrms.
Overall, Q has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on R&D investment. As al-
ready argued, when the demand for R&D investment is controlled, the eﬀects
of human capital become less signiﬁcant. We provide evidence that the eﬀects
of founders’ human capital are mediated by investment opportunities. The re-
sults indicate that founders who have these characteristics tend to raise more
funds for R&D, perhaps because they have more investment opportunities for
R&D. Previous studies have argued that credit to new-technology based ﬁrms
is rationed because of imperfections in capital markets (e.g., Colombo and
Grilli, 2007). However, the ﬁndings of this paper suggest that ﬁnancing of
high-tech start-ups may rather depend on investment opportunities. In this
regard, research on start-up ﬁnancing should not ignore the demand side in
considering R&D investment. At least in stagnated countries like Japan, one
18should take into account the demand for R&D investment more carefully.
6. Conclusions
This paper has explored R&D ﬁnancing of start-up ﬁrms. Using a sample from
an original survey conducted in 2008, we identiﬁed whether initial funds and
founder-speciﬁc characteristics relate to R&D investment of start-up ﬁrms in
Japan. It was found that internal ﬁnance is positively associated with R&D
investment. It was also found that founders with higher educational back-
ground, prior innovation output and academic aﬃliation tend to raise more
funds for R&D. On the other hand, we provided evidence that the eﬀects
of founders’ human capital are mediated by investment opportunities, which
would indicate that R&D investment of start-up ﬁrms depends heavily on in-
vestment opportunities.
Because high-tech start-ups are expected to stimulate future economic
growth through innovation, much attention has recently been paid on innova-
tion of ﬁrms—especially of start-up ﬁrms that invest heavily on R&D. If, as
Brown et al. (2009) argued, young high-tech ﬁrms face binding ﬁnancial con-
straints, then exogenous changes in the supply of internal or external ﬁnance
leads to changes in R&D. In fact, previous studies have argued that ﬁnancial
constraints prevent start-up ﬁrms from investing in R&D. These studies tend
to emphasize that the imperfections in external capital markets cause harm to
start-up ﬁrms. However, suﬃcient attention has not been paid in these studies
to the opportunities for R&D investment of start-up ﬁrms. In contrast, the
ﬁndings of this paper indicate that R&D investment of start-up ﬁrms depends
on investment opportunities. In order to understand how high-tech start-ups
raise funds from capital markets, one needs to take into account the eﬀects of
19investment opportunities. This would be able to provide better insights not
only into the strategic behavior of start-up ﬁrms, but also into the dynamics
of competitive process and the evolution of market structure.
Appendix
In Table 8, it is assumed that the demand for R&D is endogenously determined
by human capital, the IPO intention, appropriability and technological oppor-
tunities. In order to demonstrate the eﬀects of human capital on the demand
for R&D, we show the estimation results in Table A1 when estimating the
determinants of the demand for R&D. As shown in Table A1, the coeﬃcients
of EDU U and EDU G are positive, although those of EXP W are negative.
This indicates that founders with high higher educational background tend
to have larger demand for R&D. These ﬁndings are similar to those of Table
7, suggesting that founders’ human capital that relates to R&D investment
aﬀects the demand for R&D.
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23Table 1: Descriptive statistics of R&D investment
R&D investment Mean S.D. 25% Median 75% N
All 6.8 31.8 0.0 0.5 2.0 363
Independent ﬁrm 3.2 8.4 0.0 0.5 2.0 304
Subsidiary and aﬃliated ﬁrm 25.5 74.2 0.0 0.5 10.0 59
Notes: S.D. indicates the standard deviation. N indicates the number of observations.
The value of R&D investment is expressed in millions of yen.
24Table 2: Sources of initial funding
Firms Initial funds
Funding sources M Ratio (M/N) Mean S.D. Median
(1) Founder’s own funds 327 0.901 5.4 8.8 3.0
(2) Family and friends 101 0.278 4.4 6.5 2.0
(3) Individual investor 28 0.077 6.3 8.5 2.75
(4) Public ﬁnancial institute 43 0.118 10.9 14.2 6.0
(5) Private ﬁnancial institute 27 0.074 71.2 172.3 10.0
(6) Parent ﬁrm 43 0.118 140.8 431.5 14.0
(7) Subsidy 7 0.019 4.6 5.4 2.0
(8) Others 24 0.066 28.2 109.2 3.25
Total 363 1.000 31.8 163.3 5.0
(Internal ﬁnance)
(1) + (2) 332 0.915 6.6 10.0 3.29
(1) + (2) +(6) 357 0.983 23.1 154.9 4.0
Notes: S.D. indicates the standard deviation. N indicates the number of observations,
and N = 363. The value of internal ﬁnance is expressed in millions of yen.
25Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the demand for R&D investment
Demand for R&D investment Mean S.D. 25% Median 75% N
All 17.9 68.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 363
Independent ﬁrm 10.4 19.2 1.0 4.0 10.0 304
Subsidiary and aﬃliated ﬁrm 56.7 158.5 2.0 6.0 40.0 59
Notes: S.D. indicates the standard deviation. N indicates the number of observations.
The value of R&D investment is expressed in millions of yen.
26Table 4: Deﬁnitions of variables
Variables Deﬁnitions
R R&D investment (millions of yen)
(Founder-speciﬁc characteristics)
EDU U Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has undergraduate education, 0
otherwise.
EDU G Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has graduate school education,
0 otherwise.
EXP W Dummy variable: 1 if the founder had prior work experience in
the related ﬁeld at start-up, 0 otherwise.
EXP M Dummy variable: 1 if the founder had prior managerial experience
in other ﬁrms at start-up, 0 otherwise.
INNOV Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has prior experience of prod-
uct/process innovations at start-up, 0 otherwise.
ACAD Dummy variable: 1 if the founder is a member of academic asso-
ciation in the natural sciences, 0 otherwise.
AGE Logarithm of the founder’s age at start-up.
(Internal ﬁnance)
IF FP Founder’s own funds plus his or her family’s and friends’ funds
plus funds provided by the parent ﬁrm (millions of yen)
IF F Founder’s own funds plus his or her family’s and friends’ funds
(millions of yen)
(Demand for R&D)
Q Required R&D investment (millions of yen)
(Others: control variables)
MFOUND Dummy variable: 1 if the ﬁrm has multiple founders, 0 otherwise.
SUB Dummy variable: 1 if the ﬁrm is founded as a subsidiary or aﬃli-
ated ﬁrm, 0 otherwise (as an independent ﬁrm)
(Others: instruments)
IPO Dummy variable: 1 if the founder is willing to go public, 0 other-
wise.
APPROP Degree of appropriability (see Okamuro et al. (2009)).
TECHOPP Degree of technological opportunities (see Okamuro et al. (2009)).
27Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the variables
All Independent ﬁrm
(N = 363) (N = 304)
Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
EDU U 0.512 —– —– 0.503 —– —–
EDU G 0.113 —– —– 0.115 —– —–
EXP W 0.857 —– —– 0.855 —– —–
EXP M 0.372 —– —– 0.339 —– —–
INNOV 0.358 —– —– 0.342 —– —–
ACAD 0.146 —– —– 0.138 —– —–
AGE 3.824 0.252 3.850 3.810 0.256 3.850
IF FP 22.738 153.630 4.000 —– —– —–
IF F —– —– —– 6.464 10.288 3.000
Q 17.931 68.006 5.000 10.412 19.176 4.000
MFOUND 0.482 —– —– 0.457 —– —–
SUB 0.163 —– —– —– —– —–
IPO 0.281 —– —– 0.306 —– —–
APPROP 1.192 0.207 1.167 1.188 0.210 1.167
TECHOPP 0.892 0.173 0.853 0.900 0.173 0.940
Notes: S.D. indicates the standard deviation. N indicates the number of observations.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 7: Determinants of R&D investment
All Independent ﬁrm
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
EDU U 9.679∗ 4.250 2.001 2.182 1.633 0.510
(4.946) (3.755) (2.093) (1.488) (1.436) (1.110)
EDU G 24.978∗∗∗ 19.624∗∗∗ 6.879∗∗ 7.366∗∗∗ 6.948∗∗∗ 4.437∗∗
(8.044) (6.071) (3.447) (2.436) (2.346) (1.811)
EXP W −21.486∗∗∗ −13.124∗∗∗ −5.151∗ −2.428 −2.426 −1.836
(6.291) (4.792) (2.698) (1.928) (1.851) (1.427)
EXP M −1.708 −4.113 −2.044 1.164 0.908 −0.128
(4.907) (3.722) (2.084) (1.472) (1.416) (1.097)
INNOV 6.891 9.108∗∗ 4.011∗ 1.982 2.101 1.246
(4.849) (3.672) (2.055) (1.466) (1.409) (1.086)
ACAD 11.783∗ 11.708∗∗ 4.590 2.850 2.184 2.087
(6.647) (5.016) (2.807) (2.088) (2.014) (1.547)
AGE 0.518 −3.707 4.697 −3.764 −4.171 −0.480
(9.403) (7.114) (4.010) (2.781) (2.676) (2.091)
IF FP 0.137∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013)




MFOUND 8.381∗ 5.096 −2.386 3.565∗∗ 2.924∗∗ 0.077
(4.655) (3.525) (1.994) (1.398) (1.353) (1.068)
SUB 20.509∗∗∗ 6.986 2.622
(6.213) (4.895) (2.774)
Constant −9.587 6.944 −24.416 11.041 11.954 −1.205
(36.152) (27.327) (15.416) (10.641) (10.235) (7.997)
N 363 363 363 304 304 304
log-likelihood −1201 −1139 −1008 −790 −783 −732
LR statistic 51.0∗∗∗ 176.4∗∗∗ 437.4∗∗∗ 27.1∗∗∗ 41.1∗∗∗ 143.6∗∗∗
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate the 1%, 5% and
10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. N indicates the number of observations.
30Table 8: Determinants of R&D investment: endogenous regressor
All Independent ﬁrm
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
EDU U 0.935 2.046 −0.283 −0.137
(2.849) (2.110) (1.331) (1.279)
EDU G 8.509∗ 7.516 2.478 2.607
(5.156) (4.840) (2.288) (2.216)
EXP W −4.408 −5.479∗ −1.509 −1.550
(4.417) (3.217) (1.632) (1.612)
EXP M −3.417 −2.148 −0.911 −0.851
(2.518) (2.159) (1.306) (1.275)
INNOV 6.426∗∗∗ 4.203∗ 0.671 0.641
(2.478) (2.299) (1.257) (1.252)
ACAD 6.914∗∗ 4.848 2.101 2.226
(3.389) (3.131) (1.765) (1.752)
AGE 0.551 4.327 2.048 2.144





Q 0.489∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.208) (0.127) (0.122)
MFOUND −1.333 −2.040 −2.062 −1.832
(2.917) (2.720) (1.640) (1.497)
SUB −1.161 2.912
(5.808) (3.179)
Constant −10.087 −22.738 −11.327 −11.376
(18.428) (17.842) (10.209) (10.172)
N 363 363 304 304
log-likelihood −3064 −2749 −2034 −2018
Wald statistic 168.1∗∗∗ 738.7∗∗∗ 52.2∗∗∗ 72.6∗∗∗
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate the 1%, 5% and
10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. N indicates the number of observations. Q is
an endogenous variables, and the additional instruments are IPO, APPROP and
TECHOPP.
31Table A1: Determinants of the demand for R&D
All Independent ﬁrm
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
EDU U 12.508∗ 1.397 4.177∗ 3.010
(7.353) (3.427) (2.265) (2.170)
EDU G 26.353∗∗ 15.605∗∗∗ 7.141∗ 6.314∗
(12.388) (5.758) (3.817) (3.643)
EXP W −25.620∗∗ −9.255∗∗ −1.174 −1.231
(10.065) (4.694) (3.101) (2.957)
EXP M 1.028 −3.180 2.770 2.159
(7.443) (3.457) (2.283) (2.180)
INNOV −3.259 4.970 1.336 1.556
(7.465) (3.473) (2.310) (2.203)
ACAD 0.284 5.682 −0.581 −2.018
(10.531) (4.890) (3.341) (3.197)
AGE 10.747 −3.391 −5.256 −5.812





MFOUND 13.169∗ 7.523∗∗ 7.769∗∗∗ 6.108∗∗∗
(7.111) (3.304) (2.190) (2.110)
SUB 46.613∗∗∗ 9.631∗∗
(9.475) (4.518)
IPO 22.863∗∗∗ 9.582∗∗ 10.447∗∗∗ 10.953∗∗∗
(7.998) (3.731) (2.383) (2.274)
APPROP −15.309 −6.901 −5.382 −2.500
(16.894) (7.845) (5.162) (4.950)
TECHOPP −11.436 9.162 −4.498 −2.223
(21.672) (10.076) (6.653) (6.357)
Constant −1.760 18.356 30.900 25.708
(66.500) (30.871) (20.049) (19.141)
N 363 363 304 304
Adj. R2 0.106 0.808 0.120 0.200
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate the 1%, 5% and
10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. N indicates the number of observations.
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